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A NEW INSTRUMENT FOR THE INTERPRETATION
OF LAW-ESPECIALLY PRIMITIVE
BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI t
THE two names on the title-page are a guarantee of the value and
importance of this book: Karl N. Llewellyn, a leading light in American
jurisprudence; E. Adamson Hoebel, an ethnographer with an excellent
record in field-work and theoretical contributions, especially to primitive
law. The Cheyenne Way is a stepping stone and a landmark in the
program of social science. It suffers from some extravagances of style
and treatment which are provocative. Some of its hesitancies and fail-
ures will stimulate further research. Certain achievements are lasting
and will prove of great value to social science, anthropology, and to the
theory of law, primitive and crystallized.
The aim of the book is "the development of a social science instru-
ment for the recording and interpretation of law-ways among primitive
peoples" (p. viii). The instrument is developed against the background
of the cultural life of the Cheyenne Indians. In some ways this appears
to be an excellent background. "The curious and lovely Cheyenne
material" (p. 289), as the authors* lyrically describe it, allows them to
lay bare certain aspects of primitive justice and primitive judicial process.
The material is also difficult to handle: the Indians have been long sub-
jected to the process of detribalization, to new environmental settings,
to changing economic systems, and undoubtedly also to the influence of
the white man's legal and political pressure. All this complicates matters
and not all of the resulting tangles seem to have been unravelled.
The authors have digested the older literature, especially the works
of George Bird Grinnell. They have by original field-work supplemented
the older data with regard to the legal principles and practices of their
natives. This, indeed, is "a vital phase of social life which was ethno-
logically terra incognita in the days of Grinnell" (p. viii).
The greatest importance of the book consists in the theory of law,
in general and of primitive law in particular which forms the founda-
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tion of the treatment of Cheyenne law. The authors are fully aware
that the cross-fertilization of jurisprudence by the study of primitive
law is beneficial for both. In the study of communities where law is
neither codified nor administered before courts, nor yet enforced by
constabulary, certain problems arise which can be easily overlooked in
a jurisprudence based on our own formal and crystallized systems. Why
have men to obey certain rules? Why have such rules to be known by
the actors, formulated, and made valid? Why is the validity of some
such rules never questioned, while others seem to offer constant tempta-
tion to breach?
Such questions and cognate ones face the ethnographer who tries to
formulate the principles of what in primitive communities corresponds
to the process of law. The very definition of law and its relation to
custom, ethical rule, the norms of manner and etiquette, are problems
which must be raised and answered by the field-worker, the student of
comparative jurisprudence, and the sociologist who attempts to place
law in relation to social control, and social control in relation to culture
as a whole.
I shall try here to state the position of primitive jurisprudence in my
own terms and from my point of view which, as far as I can see, is
cognate to that of the present book. The crucial problem in the study
of primitive law turns round the concept of cultural determinism. Is
man's organized and implemented behavior, that is culture, subject to
laws in the scientific sense? Many modern anthropologists would prob-
ably answer this in the negative. So does one of the most brilliant
contemporary thinkers in jurisprudence, one who has contributed greatly
towards our understanding of the relation of law to culture and its
processes. "Social life and social relations are . . . basically incon-
gruous and disorderly."' '
1. CAIRNs, THE THEORY OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1941) 53. The whole Chapter 4,
"The Principle of Disorder", in which this sentence occurs, turns round the thesis that
there is no such thing as an intrinsic determinism of culture. The Author suggests that
"the notion that social life is essentially orderly and congruous" is due to the "mech-
anistic" approach of certain sociologists. "The human world is thus one of infinite com-
plexity." "In social theory . . . order cannot . . . be assumed as part of the data,"
The writer's thesis is that such order as we find in human societies is due to "intentional
controls invented by man." ". . The order which exists in human society at any
given time is predominantly an achieved order, an invention at the center of which
is man . . . ." All this to me begs the question of why, and for what reasons the
inventors of order invented it. In my opinion human inventions are determined by the
needs of the individual and of the community. Once we agree on this, the sec6nd
question arises whether the invention of order is not quite as much determined by real
conditions of human co-operation and common life, as the invention of fire, stone imple-
ments, dwellings, weapons, canoes- and indeed the "invention" of the family, marriage,
authority, knowledge, magic, recreation, and religion.
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Culture, however, primitive and developed alike, is subject to the
laws of physics since human bodies are first and foremost lumps of
matter. Each body is an organism, alive and active and submitted to
the laws of biology. Hence culture is also largely determined by the
biological process within the human body and by the organic needs of
man. Culture and its development again consists in technological in-
vention, that is, in the discovery by man of natural laws and in their
application to human ends. In any partial process of culture, men.
organized and fitted out with artifacts, follow the rules of technique
determined by natural law. These technical rules shade immediately
and almost imperceptibly into rules of concerted action. Such rules carry
a sociological quota and are symbolically formulated. They are partly
determined by physical, physiological, and technological principles.
Imagine a primitive team of carpenters who have to construct an
outrigger canoe from a log and beams, poles, and planks. They start
from the point of deciding to do it, and then have to prepare the
material, carry it to one spot, shape it adequately, construct the object,
and then use it for determined ends. The laws of behavior, in its tech-
nical, economic, legal, moral, and even magical aspects, form an integral
whole which determines the actions of every individual of the group,
as well as the physical and physiological phases of the relation between
man and matter. The end or purpose, the starting point, the determinisms
of mechanics and hydro-dynamics, as well as of muscular and nervous
energies, are integrated into a system which is neither chaotic, nor dis-
orderly, which indeed is determined and regulated by principles open to
observation and capable of being formulated.
The same could be said of any other teclmical achievement by con-
certed and organized action. The production of fire and of stone imple-
ments, the co-ordination of food gathering, hunting, fishing, or agri-
culture, are one and all determined by the task, the materials available,
and the relation of manual technique to co-operative interchange of
services. The structure of economics, of the normative system, of
organized recreation, and of magical and religious cults is also based
on the human needs which are satisfied in each such activity. Human
needs in turn are not arbitrary, but are based on physiology and environ-
ment, and also on the nature of those instrumentalities, physical, social,
and psychological, which constitute culture. All the fundamental cate-
gories of human behavior are subject to the intrinsic determinism of
culture. And here, as in all other branches of genuine science, we shall
have to remain satisfied with general principles of the fundamenital and
relevant: de nininis non curat lex - whether this be scientific or man-
made law.
Organized human activities at a primitive or advanced level are thus
first and foremost determined by the specific problems of man's physio-
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logical needs. The solution consists in technological production related
to the use of the product. The social and legal rules of property, of
privilege, and of duty are part and parcel of the solution of a practical
problem through applied knowledge, social co-operation, and the estab-
lishment of cultural values. Cultural determinism is deeply founded
in the fact that no activity at a primitive or developed level takes place
without being directly or indirectly related to the basic needs of the
human organism.
This indirect or roundabout solution of man's organic needs within
his environment imposes secondary determinants. These can be classified
into such aspects of culture as the economic, the educational, the norma-
tive, and also those pertaining to the use of language, the development
of knowledge, and the exercise of religious and magical cults. The very
fact that in the last quarter of a century anthropology has established
general principles of primitive economics, of preliterate education, of
early jurisprudence, as well as outlines of the first stages in episte-
mology, and the nature of magic and religion, is a proof that cultural
determinism has already been scientifically established. Human beings
at all levels of development act not within a chaos, nor yet in a non-
determined, many-dimensional vacuum, but are subject to clear and specific
determinants of behavior.
Another line on which the existence of order in culture can be recog-
nized is the recurrence of typical forms of organization, that is, of
institutions. The family, the municipality, the organization of kinship
and clanship, age-grades, and occupational teams are universals of primi-
tive culture. Evolution consists in a constantly increasing institutional
crystallization of such specific activities as those related to economic
production, distribution, and consumption; the administration of law
and justice; education and politics; practices of religious cult; the culti-
vation of science, literature, art and music; and the pursuit of sport
and recreation.
Again, it would not be difficult to make an inventory of primitive
artifacts: stone implements, fire, dwellings, means of transport and
locomotion, and weapons- all these exist everywhere. At any level of
development the inventory overlaps almost completely from one culture
to another, even as regards the main types of mystical instrumentalities.
Each type of artifact determines similar techniques, forms of co-opera-
tion, rules of ownership, and systems of value. Starting from the ma-
terial substratum of culture, we would find again a number of concrete,
clear, and definite lines on which general and specific principles of
cultural determination can be established.
Symbolism, notably in language, can be shown to fall under gram-
matical and syntactic, as well as semantic categories which are universal.
Everywhere we find the same parts of speech, the same structure of
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the sentence, the same uses of metaphor and abstraction, the same dis-
tinction between concrete and particular on the one hand, and general
or conceptual on the other.
Minor differences occur and make the study of anthropology interesting
and inspiring. Underlying such differences, however, there is the uni-
versal determinism based on the fact that man has always primarily
to satisfy his basic organic needs; that in doing this by creating the
artificial environment of culture, he has to act under conditions of order,
continuity, predictability, and authority. Culture thus is submitted to
the primary determinism of natural law, physical and physiological, and
also to the secondary determinisms of its own instrumentalities.
In all this the fundamental rules of behavior defining the relations
between individuals and groups re-appear once more, as an integral part
of the determinism of culture. Agreements between individuals through
contract; rules of conduct based on birth and status; reciprocal con-
catenations of duties which establish such typical relations as betAeen
husband and wife, parents and children, kinsmen and clansmen; the
duties and privileges of status, rank, and authority, occur throughout
and are invariably true to type.
We can thus speak about the laws of culture in the widest sense.
"Law" here means in every case a generalization with predictive value,
arrived at by the inductive study of various cultures.2  The existence
of such "laws" of cultural process makes anthropology as a scientific
study possible. Its value has been proved by the increased quality of
modem field-work, which under the guidance of general principles of
anthropology operates with much more exact conceptions and is able
to disclose the reality of primitive education, primitive economics, and
primitive legal or normative processes, as well as to study the institutions
of a tribe.
2. Examples of such laws are contained already in the previous argument. Th'ze
acquainted with the works of Sumner and Keller, Westermark, Hobhouse, Durkheim,
Radcliffe-Brown, R. W. Firth, A. I. Richards, G. P. Murdock- to mention but a
a few names-.will easily supply many other cases. The large scale enterprise of
digesting, ordering, and classifying ethnographic evidence, which under the title of
"cross-cultural survey" is now in progress under the direction of G. P. Murdoch at
the Institute of Hmhan Relations, Yale University, is perhaps the most important and
decisive argument in favor of cultural determinism. The present reviewer would lil:e
to refer also to his articles: Culture, Excvc. Soc. SciEzcas (1931); The Group aud
the Individual (1939) 44 Am. J. Soc. 938; Mfan's Culture and Man's Behazicr (1941)
29 SiGmA Xi Q. 186, (1942) 30 id. at 62; Marriage, Exmac. BmiTArateI (ed. 1929) ; Kin-
ship, id.; and Social Anthropology, id. CA.uPLE AND Ccoox, PiAN-cirLEs FR A:;viuiroL-
oGY (1942), a recently published textbook, is perhaps the first full and well dccumentcd
exposition of the science of man from the point of view of cultural determinism. The
reader will find there a mine of illustrations of what the principles of cultural deter-
minism are.
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The term law obviously means in this context something essentially
different from law as rule traditionally established or promulgated,
obeyed, or broken and enforced. Indeed, the laws of cultural determinism
are to a large extent obeyed without ever being stated by those concerned.
Thus the distinction must be made between rules implicitly followed
and rules formulated. It is clear that primitive man from the outset
obeyed the natural laws of physical and biological process in every phase
of his behavior. He was subject to the principles of blood circulation,
of breathing, and of digestion, although he was not cognizant of them.
Indeed, the more fundamental the law of nature or the law of physiology
or psychology, the later is its appearance in human knowledge, hence
in human statement. The primitive savage, very much like the modern
man of science, refuses to see and to acknowledge the obvious.
Certain rules of technology on the other hand, and also of social
conduct, had to be formulated or at least fixed in standardized practice
from the very beginnings of culture. All concerted action implies a
symbolic co-ordination of movements. Rules of authority, of status,
as well as the elementary rules of technique, had to be transmitted from
generation to generation, hence they also were made explicit either
verbally or in standardized behavior. We have thus the important dis-
tinction to make between (1) rules of cultural determinism accepted,
but neither known nor stated; and (2) rules explicitly standardized and
formulated in early symbolic gesture or sound,
To this distinction we have to add another. Among the rules stated
and known, as well as taught and transmitted, there are again two
classes. The first is automatically sanctioned by the coercion of efficiency
or by the convenience of conventionality. The coercion of efficiency can
be clearest seen in technological rules. Unless rules which define the
raw material, its conditions, its preparation, and the way of handling
it are followed, the implement will not be properly made, the fire will
not be kindled, the hut will collapse and the canoe founder. -lunting,
fishing, or agriculture will give no results unless men know the environ-
ment and follow the techniques which embody their knowledge.
The rules of convenience can be found most clearly in the regularities
and conventions which control human relations in everyday common
life. From the very outset human behavior had to be regular and pre-
dictable, since it was collective or social. The time-table of daily life;
the manners and conventions of common feeding, of uniform dress, of
custom in walking, working, and sleeping were indispensable. Human
beings have to depend upon the behavior of others. The high value of
convention and uniformity in primitive cultures, and again in our modern
cultures of mass production, is not a freak, but a necessity. Thus a
whole set of regularities of human behavior remain outside any socially
organized enforcement. In addition to these, many rules of manners,
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conventions of behavior, tricks of useful technique, material and social,
once adopted prove their own utility and efficiency. There are also no
temptations to break or to stretch such rules.
As soon as a rule curbs certain physiological propensities or delimits
the advantages and claims of two or more parties, there enters the ele-
ment of divergent interest. Thus rules referring to the distribution of
food, rules related to sex, to authority, to privilege, and duty respec-
tively; all the rules which impose more effort and less reward on a class,
group, or individual for the advantage of another, have to be sanctioned.
Here enter also the rules which protect life and property, and prevent
bodily harm between individuals, that is, rules of criminal law. There
must exist in all these cases definite codes known and accepted by those
concerned. There is here always a temptation to evade, to stretch, or
to break such rules. Hence disputes, early forms of litigation and of
adjustment do occur at a primitive level. In the course of evolution
the stretching and the breaking of law produce the maclinery of law
in our modem sense.
In this last sentence, the term law once again appears in two meanings:
as (1), law of order, and (2), law of correction. Homonyms are a
perennial source of confusion in scientific arguments. In the study of
law the confusion created by the multiple meanings given to the main
term has been as vicious as anywhere. In our argument at least four
different meanings have made their appearance.
Law (1) is the rule of determinism. It is used here in the same sense
in which "law" appears in the phrase "law of science" or "lawv of
nature". In this context we are primarily concerned with the laws of
cultural determinism.
Law (2) is the rule of conduct standardized in behavior or verbally
formulated. The rules of knowledge, of technology, of co-operation,
of common life, and of convention, enter into this class. The rules of
primitive knowledge usually occur as imperative or, at least, normative
statements, since they are formulated invariably so as to fit pragmatic
contexts. They bear a strong surface resemblance to other imperatives
of tradition.
Law (3) applies to rules of conduct which refer to relations between
individuals and groups, delimit divergent interests, and curtail disruptive
physiological and sociological tendencies. Here enter most rules of
property, contract, status and authority, as well as the rules protecting
human life and limb, and limiting sexual rights to well-defined social
relations.
Law (4) is the specific mechanism which is brought into existence
when a conflict of claims arises or a rule of social conduct is broken.
Let me first state that this is not meant to be a full classification of
all rules and norms of behavior, knowledge, or belief. Some distinc-
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tions, especially with reference to magic and religion as contrasted with
knowledge, would have to be made in a fuller analysis. The aim of
this little list is to show clearly that some of the ambiguities must be
eliminated before jurisprudence can be made safe from its own verbal
confusion. The differences indicated are real and the categories distinct.
The concept of Law (1) is clear-if there is a scientific approach to
culture, such laws must exist, for science begins with the formulation
of general principles. The distinction between Law (1) and Law (2)
consists in that the laws of the science of culture can only be formulated
by the student, while the principles of Law (2) are formulated by native
tradition. Native tradition consists of doctrines, principles of knowl-
edge, beliefs and mythologies. This body of primitive lore becomes
applied to behavior in the form of rules of conduct. We might speak
of cultural determinism as, on the one hand, defined by the scientific
observer, and, on the other, interpreted by the *natives and applied by
them to their own behavior. Law (1) contains the principles of deter-
minism stated by the observer, Law (2) the principles of conduct derived
by the natives from their own traditional body of doctrine.
The interest of jurisprudence begins with the distinction between
Law (2) and Law (3). The rules of Law (2), in so far as we find
in them an automatic sanction, are not subject to the tensions and the
conflicts which make the maintenance of Law (3) invariably a dynamic
process. They lack above all the element of sanction as a social reaction.
Law (3), on the other hand, corresponds definitely to Law as we use
the term in our own society. Rules which delimit claims and interests
have to be known and clearly stated. Their maintenance is a matter of
concern to those whose claims and interests are involved. Laws of this
type are often positively sanctioned, that is, strict observance is rewarded,
quite as much as inadequacy and breach punished.
I suggest, however, that it is the distinction between Law (3) and
Law (4), that is, the law of order and law maintained, as opposed to
the retributive and restitutive social action, which has to be emphatically
stated. The two are in a way exclusive of each other. When we speak
of a law-abiding community, we mean Law (3). When we speak that
"law" has been brought into action, we mean Law (4). Law (4) comes
into being when Law (3) ceases to work. As long as Law (3) reigns,
there is no room for Law (4).
The two realities, order and the mechanisms of its re-establishment,
are clearly related. They are also in a way exclusive of each other.
They are indeed complementary in one way and exclusive in another.
To identify them, to use the same word indistinctly and confusingly so
as to cover the two processes, both "maintenance" and "restitution",
is a terminological confusion.
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Our main plea, therefore, is that in all arguments of jurisprudence
the term law should be used with a clearly defined meaning. This can
easily be achieved by a contextual or adjectival distinction such as "law
of cultural determinism", "law or rule of native conduct", "law of order
and maintenance" and "the mechanisms of law when breach occurs."
Returning to the present book, I think that the position of the authioirs
is in principle cognate to the outline here given. In discussing the con-
cept of claim the authors state that "it takes the form of an alleged
right or rightfulness which tends inevitably, in the context of any par-
ticular group or Whole, to get itself set up as being properly a part
of the way that Whole is going around, or of the way it ought to 5nd
is about to go around, if the claimant be successful" (p. 274). This,
I take it, means that every specific law- and here law must be under-
stood as an element of order and a part of concerted action - has to be
studied in relation to an organized system of activities, that is an insti-
tution. To study the claims within a family or a local group, or a
military society, we must know the structure and the working of such
an institution.
The positive aspect, that is the need of understanding why laws work
before we proceed to their breach, is also clearly stated. "The members
of the group, working within its order, then either manage so to handle
divergent claims as to keep the 'group' still the group, or else the law-
jobs fail to get done, and the group explodes or dribbles apart, or dies"
(p. 274). This again I interpret as a sound rule of method. Every
element of primitive law, every claim, is determined by the need to main-
tain the identity of the group. This, however, is not merely a formal
principle. A group like the family has a definite purpose to achieve.
The same is true of a team of buffalo hunters, of a military society, of
people who combine for any pursuit, economic, religious, or administra-
tive. Hence, in the above quotation I would like to make one correction.
"The group explodes or dribbles apart, or dies" not merely because the
law-jobs fail to be done. The law-jobs have to be done, because this is
an indispensable condition for the achievement of the real tasks of each
group. Law is not an end in itself, but an indispensable instrumentality
for the achievement of the real, ultimately biological ends of human
activities.
The primary source, therefore, of social constraint, which as a sanc-
tion distinguishes law from other rules, lies in the organization of the
groups for the achievement of definite ends. In other words the sanction
of primitive law resides in the constitution of purposeful, organized,
and effectively working systems of human activities. The rules which
are fundamental to the working of such institutions as the family and
the clan, the military society, the age-grade, the tribe, and the occupa-
tional team have to be maintained. As Llewellyn and Hoebel repeatedly
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state, any failure to maintain the rules makes an end to the institution.
An end of an institution again means that a number of essential tasks
fail to be done. Extinguish the family, and reproduction, nutrition and
kinship are finished. Extinguish the municipality and there will be no
co-operation nor exploitation of the environment. The law of order and
of co-operation is thus, at least implicitly, recognized by the authors as
one of the primary factors in cultural determinism. The fundamental
rules of marriage and kinship, of property, inheritance, and succession,
of co-operation or agreement, are as indispensable to the effective success
of an activity as the tools used, the food consumed, the participants who
work, and the values which guide them.
It is clear that this approach to primitive law and law in general is
wider than that of the lawyer who is merely a craftsman in our modern
legal system. The lawyer qua craftsman must primarily be interested
in law breaking, in guiding of the clients' conduct so as to prevent punish-
ment if not breach, in framing contracts and effecting compromises.
All this brings about his professional involvements and his financial
emoluments. The sociologist and the ethnographer on the other hand
must primarily be interested in the working of social control, that is,
in the maintenance of order. I would like to suggest that today juris-
prudence must also take the deeper as well as the more comprehensive
view of the problems of law.
The lawyer of yesterday was as a craftsman perfectly justified in
treating his subject as a self-contained universe of discourse, since
change in the constitution of human societies and consequently the
change in Law (3) were almost imperceptible. Under such conditions
law codified or statutory, law customary and given in the precedent,
could be treated on the principle of status quo. The whole work of
courts, judges, and counsel, that is, Law (4), moved within a well
established reality which changed but little, and the foundations of which
could be taken for granted. The lawyers of the older generation could,
like the venerable surgeons and physicians of yore, carry on their trade,
accepting traditional data as something which need not be constantly
revised.
When, however, the whole foundations of a craft or a practice, which
is or ought to be an applied science, move and change in a well-nigh
revolutionary manner, the relation between the craft and its doctrine,
and the relation between that doctrine and the underlying reality, become
a problem and an imperative problem at that. Thus today the prac-
ticing physician or surgeon has constantly to be concerned with new
discoveries more or less revolutionary, and the craft or applied science
of medicine cannot disregard its wider contexts of pathology, physiology,
bio-chemistry, and even physics.
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The reality again to which modern patholog, and even physiology
refer is not static. The concentration of human beings in large cities,
the nervous strain of modem life, certain types of labor in mines,
factories, and tropical climates have created new environments for the
human organism, new diseases, and new needs for hygiene and pre-
ventive medicine. Medical practice, therefore, has to follow the changes
in medical science and this again constantly has to readjust to new
needs of human organisms working under ever-changing conditions of
strain and stress, and new dangers of infection.
In our modern world law also changes in consequence of new legal
doctrines and theories, which in turn have to follow the new realities
of culture. The industrial revolution with its needs of factory laws,
trade union charters, the organization of trusts and the need of limiting
these, has contributed towards our theoretical as well as practical insight
into the nature of law. Every political revolution creates new theories
and new conditions of law; Napoleon's code, the German Biirgerliche
Gesetzbuch, the new constitutions of Russia, of Nazi Germany, and
of Fascist Italy are examples. Law is but a part of social and cultural
engineering. Today the questions about the limits of legislative action,
about its relation to political force and economic efficiency, about its
ability to create new types of man and new types of culture, are as
practically cogent as they are theoretically illuminating.
Law does not work any more within a ritual, almost hieratic atmos-
phere of traditional quiescence. Law has been often used as an instru-
ment of legislative omnipotence. There was an attempt to make a whole
nation sober by law. It failed. In Nazi Germany a whole nation is
being transformed into a gang of bloodthirsty world-bandits through
the instrumentality of law, among others. This, we hope, will fail again.
The Italian dictator is trying to make his intelligent, cynical, and peace-
loving people into courageous heroes. The fundamentalists have tried
in some states of this Union to make people God-fearing and bibliolatric
by law. A great communistic Union has tried to abolish God, marriage,
and the family, again by law.
The question, therefore, whether law is omnipotent is as important
to the modem jurist as it is interesting to the sociologist. There are
limits to the lawmaker. These result from the relation between law
and the existing order in society. To study this relation is, in my
opinion, not only the central problem of the sociology of law, but also
of the lawyer's own jurisprudence. We must have juridical planning
quite as much as we now have planned economics, planned politics,
planned education and planned cultural regimes. Planning in itself, as
we lmow from engineering, banking, and education, need not become
a vice or a danger. Doctrinaire planning, the planning on lines of crude
and partisan visions such as we find in totalitarianism, becomes a vice
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and a peril because it is done without any consideration given to the
realities of human culture and human nature. The clearer our recognition
that law is a system of principles which are deeply founded in the
working of human culture and human society, the sounder will be our
general jurisprudence and the better will it be able to assist the creation
and the administration of a working social order.
To take but one concrete example: the creation of collective security
in our future world is the very prerequisite of the survival of culture.
What must be the nature of such international law that it may work
and solve our problems, instead of complicating them and lending itself
to partisan abuses? The problem cannot be solved by the application
of precedent, for this does not exist. Nor can we have recourse to
any old doctrine borrowed from Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, or
Grotius. The foundations of the future international law of collective
security, collective prosperity, and collective interchange of universally
human services will have to be built on order, and on the vision of
what must come. We have already, in spite of all its deficiencies, a
social science and a knowledge of culture strong enough to supply us
with such a vision. Sloth, skepticism, and cynicism are out of place in
a world menaced by the catastrophe of final extinction.
I am convinced that the jurisprudence of the future can receive great
help from the contributions already made to the theory of primitive
law, incliding those of the present book. Americai students in the last
generation under the leadership of Cardozo and Pound, Holmes and
Brandeis, Hohfeld and Cook, have advanced the state of affairs by the
important distinction between "law in action" and "law in books". To
this I would like to add the other distinction, perhaps even more im-
portant; between the law of order, that is the law as it is practiced in
a society, and the mechanisms of sanctions, retributions, and restitutions,
that is the organized and institutionalized system of professional law;
the distinction, in short, implemented already in the concepts of Law
(3) and Law (4).
The study of primitive communities brings both distinctions very
clearly to the fore. Where there are no books, we have only law in
action. The careful study of primitive law in action, however, brings
us also directly to the second distinction between law of order and the
mechanisms of healing the breach. The field-worker soon discovers that
while breaches in primitive communities occur occasionally, the distinc-
tion between "keeping the law" and "breaking the law" is not so easily
established in a community where there are no codes, courts, and
constables.
Within- one household the ethnographer observes a state of well-nigh
perfect peace and harmony. This may be due to the full and general
conformity to customary law, observed by all the members. It may be
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due to the fact that the man in authority is strong enough to keep the
order of his own privileges and prerogatives so well in hand that not
even a protest is ever heard. In other households there may be constant
squabbling, recriminations, and even outbursts of anger and quarrelling.
This may be due either to a member abusing his or her position or to
an even balance between a few bad-tempered people.
The ethnographer, however, has some checks and can construct his
criteria. Public opinion within the local community provides him with
definite legal commentaries. The rules of what ought to be done and
the partial deviations from these rules can be ascertained. The principles
of what constitutes the correct relation between husband and wife, parent
and child, one household and others related to it, are easily ascertained
and form part of tribal tradition known to everybody. Marriage law,
family law, and kinship law exist in every tribe. The ethnographer may
spend a couple of years in the community without ever meeting a real
"trouble case", or a serious breach of tribal law. At the same time he
discovers that the maintenance of law is never a matter of yes or no,
that it is not an all or none reaction. It is a dynamic process of constant
struggle and readjustment. This of course applies to all other institu-
tions -the municipality, the clan, the hunting, sailing or fishing team.
The ethnographer is thus compelled to study the working of the rules
and principles of tribal law or custom under the microscope, as it were.
He cannot even discover and formuite them, unless he observes at
close range the battle of conflicting claims, the working out of a com-
promise which invariably tends to conform to the general statement of
the rule as this is found in tradition. He also discovers why this is so.
He can ascertain and state that the claims as between husband and wife,
chief and subject, clan leader and other members, are related to what
these people do together and what they have to contribute, one and all,
to the concerted actions, as well as what they receive as reward of their
contributions.
In some cases and in certain cultures the coercion of force enters as
an effective factor. We have such institutions as slavery, serfdom,
tyranny, and exploitation by secret societies or privileged groups. Yet
even here, a further analysis discloses that the organization of force
and oppression is related functionally to such phenomena as the military
constitution of the tribe, the recruiting of the slave class by inter-tribal
wars, and other general principles of cultural orientation which make
force possible within and necessary without.
The anthropological approach to law reveals better perhaps than any
other that the law of order, the principles and rules kept because they
are intrinsically related to cultural determinism in general, constitutes
a legitimate subject for study. The whole domain of social control, as
this has been named by Professor E. A. Ross, imposes itself on the
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work of the ethnographer and on his cogitations in jurisprudence, as
strongly as it seems to have been alien and unpalatable to the lawyer-
craftsman of the past and even of the present. This latter invariably
thinks of law as that which starts when the juridical machinery has to
be mobilized.
The jurisprudence of the future, I maintain, will have to accept the
anthropological position, that is study Law (3), the law of order and
maintenance, the law which is positively primed and baited, as well as
Law (4), that is the more or less organized coercive reactions of a com-
munity which are set in motion when a rule is broken definitely and
conspicuously.
I feel it best to state my own position in my own terms, although I
think it largely corresponds to the point of view which underlies the
work of Messrs. Llewellyn and Hoebel. To justify this extensive mono-
logue I would like to say that the authors perhaps have not quite clearly
stated the background of their own theory.
Thus among other points they hardly have done justice to their own
scholarship. In a book as ambitious and as important as the present
one, it might have been well to sum up, however briefly, the contem-
porary position of ethnographic jurisprudence, and to indicate the place
which the present contribution claims - and, as this reviewer would
like to add, justly claims. We find no bibliography of ethnographic
literature, no summing up of the several points of view to which the
present book is an excellent corrective.
The writers somewhat surprisingly declare that "effort after effort
at synthesis of the social disciplines over the past ten years has made
worth-while headway in all phases, except that of integrating lawstuff
with the rest" (p. 41). This might lead the reader to suspect that the
writers have not heard about such contributions as Law and the Social
Sciences by Huntington Cairns, (1935); or William A. Robson's
Civilisation and the Growth of Law, (1935); or An Introduction to
the Sociology of Law by M. S. Timasheff, (1939); or that they under-
rate the work of Roscoe Pound; of L. Petrazhitsky; of I-I. Ielsen;
of G. Gurvitch; of E. Ehrlich - to mention only a few outstanding
names. 
3
I find also some misgivings about the style in which the book is
written. In many ways it is magnificent, inspiring, candid, and attrac-
tive. It carries the reader along, it compels his attention, and all its
extravagances and involutions are clearly a matter of deliberate pur-
3. Both authors are among the most erudite scholars in past and present juris-
prudence. See for example, Llewellyn, The Theory of Legal 'Science' (1941) 20 N. C.
L. Rn'. 1, in which the writer devotes special attention to the recent book by Huntington
Cairns, already quoted. He also gives an excellent digest of tile recent theories of juris.
prudence.
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pose. With all this, the style remains cryptic. This might have been
easily remedied if, in relation to certain crucial passages where funda-
mental concepts are defined or a new and original position taken, the
writers had given, after their racy and inspired phrasing of a brilliant
idea, a sober translation into ordinary and accepted language. This is
how the cardinal concept is defined: "Law has as one of its main pur-
poses to make men go round in more or less clear ways; law does in
fact to some extent make men go round in more or less clear ways.
Law purposes to channel behavior in such manner as to prevent or avoid
conflict; and law does in important degree so channel behavior. With-
out the purpose attribute, law is unthinkable; without the effect attribute,
law cannot be said to 'prevail' in a culture, to have 'being' in it" (p. 20).
Now from this passage I am not able to decide whether the Authors
use the term law in this context in that sense which we labelled Law (3),
or as Law (4). In following the text we come upon such phrases: "Law
has the peculiar job of cleaning up social messes when they have been
made. Law thus exists also for the event of breach of law and has a
major portion of its essence in the doing of something about such a
breach. . . . The nature of law, moreover, is such that if a particular
type of result is understood to follow on breach, it is likely not to be
long before any other result, especially any graver or more severe result,
is felt as non-law, or even anti-law" (p. 20).
These passages introduce even a greater uncertainty in the present
reviewer's mind. The expression "cleaning up social messes" is pic-
turesque, but lacks precision. The adverb also leads us to suspect that
law is not merely an instrument for that socially hygienic and prophy-
lactic activity. What is its other role then? The authors remain silent.
If I had to express my preference on the several contributions of this
book, I should choose Part III, Chapters X and XI, which contain a
theory cognate at least to the one which I have tried to summarize above.
Yet here also sentence after sentence could be quoted in which new
words, original and startling-at times what appear to me excellent
neologisms-are introduced, yet without any guarantee to the reader
that he translates the meanings correctly.
'Let me quote one paragraph which I think contains some very im-
portant ideas: "The dynamics which generate a legal order, which keep
one going, and which produce change in one, have two main aspects:
drift and drive. Drift is the relatively impersonal and unnoticed lump-
ing of behavior into belts around semi-lines which come to interlock,
together with the further relatively impersonal and unnoticed shifting
of the 'centers' of such belts. Drive, on the other hand, is individuated
and personal. Moreover, it takes on of necessity a conscious aspect in
things legal, if and whenever it meets with challenge" (p. 278).
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Here, I think, one of the most important problems of jurisprudence
is stated: the distinction between the traditional growth of custom and
rules, on the one hand, and the dynamic interests of individuals and
groups, on the other. It is the very problem with which the jurispru-
dence of the future will have to deal, and one which the ethnographer
is forced to face in his field-work, as well as in all his theoretical in-
quiries. Yet here once more it would be difficult for me to keep this
passage for future quotation, or to use it as a statement of first rate
authority of a point on which I am fundamentally in agreement- or
so it appears to me. For really I still am not quite certain what "drift"
and "drive" are, nor can I completely place the "belts", the "semi-lines"
-indeed I am completely puzzled why these "semi-lines" come in, and
I am unable to visualize a semi-line, especially when it comes to inter-
lock.
And now I come to the one point on which I feel that the authors
have failed to do full justice to their theoretical intentions. In my
opinion they are clearly aware of the necessity of treating the problem
of law against a background of cultural determinism. They also are
fully aware- or so it seems to me- that the maintenance of law and
order, side by side with breach and mending, is an essential problem of
jurisprudence. If I read rightly the arguments of pages 273-309, there
is no doubt at all that Llewellyn and Hoebel are as interested in the
working of Law (3) as an instrument of order, as they are in the study
of Law (4), as the means of "cleaning up social messes." Yet through-
out the book the "messes" predominate. Thus in Chapters II, "A Theory
of Investigation", and III, "Primitive Law, and Modern", we find an
almost exclusive stress on the study of Law (4) as a consequence of
breach. They state and re-state that the analysis of "trouble cases" and
"social messes" is the royal road to the knowledge of Cheyenne tribal
law. "Trouble cases . . . are . . . the safest main road into the dis-
covery of law" (p. 29).
The material on which the arguments are largely based are fifty-three
trouble cases- a magnificent record for the one aspect of the problem,
but not sufficient to make us understand the full picture. Most of these
trouble cases incidentally refer directly to criminal acts. The exclusive
consideration of Law (4) does not allow the authors to answer the
extremely 'important question, as to whether civil law is as fully devel-
oped among their Indians as is criminal procedure.
In the treatment of "Marriage and Sex" we find some excellent
passages, especially at the beginning of the Chapter (Ch. VII). Yet
here also the substance of the marriage relations, sexual, economic,
parental, and co-operative, cannot easily -be reconstructed from the
trouble cases given, since these almost exclusively refer to certain diffi-
culties and imperfections in the legal transactions concerned with the
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marriage contract. The analysis of property and inheritance is equally
disappointing, insofar as it does not give us any clear idea of the
economic basis of Cheyenne life. We are told that property and land
did not play a large part in the legal system, but I was unable to find
what objects had to be owned, how they were owned, and how they
were handled. With the sentence, "contracts which are never broken
and almost never bargained over are not subjects for clear law" (p.
229), I cannot agree. The law of contract is law, whether it is broken
or not.
These criticisms might appear captious. I would like them to he
constructive. This book is excellent. It cries out, however, for a second
volume on Cheyenne law in which I would hope for additional data.
I would also hope that some of the cryptic passages of the present book
might be translated into the plain, conventional English of social science
at its best, an English of which both Llewellyn and Hoebel have proved
themselves masters on other occasions.
I think that in the postulated second volume we ought to have a full
outline of the cultural background of Cheyenne society as a whole. The
writers frequently refer us to the two volumes of Grinnell. Yet in
Grinnell's time, not only primitive law was terra i ncognita, but also
such subjects as economics, social structure, the concept of institution,
and the modem theory of culture and social organization. The facts
referring to most of these problems were under Grinnell's observation
and may be found in his books. A competent digest, a clearly analyzed
restatement of Cheyenne culture as Grinnell saw it and lived it, would
be a great contribution. Since Llewellyn and Hoebel are so eminently
qualified to make it, we might feel justified in asking them for this gift.
The modem functional anthropologist fully recognizes the historical
element, that is, the importance of culture change. The Cheyenne have
changed their habitat three or four times as between the days when we
first hear about them living in "the woodland lake country of the upper
Mississippi Valley"; then moving "at the beginning of the century past
to an effective adoption of the new horse culture and buffalo-hunting
economy of the Plains tribes"; then being pushed again into new reserva-
tions and subjected to a type of life which the authors might have made
a special effort to observe through the new methods of culture, change
field work. The authors claim that their data are "arranged not on a
flat time-plane, but against the moving time-perspective of the culture
and the individual life" (p. ix). This promise, however, is not fully
redeemed. Even plain time references are seldom to be found, and
occasionally only do we find some information in the case stories which
allows us vaguely to assess the integral conditions under which certain
events happened. If we had one or two consistent cultural backgrounds,
brief but filled in on such relevant points as the economic foundations,
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the amount of political independence, the administrative influence of
white goyernment, the degree to which educational, missionary, and
trading agencies had encroached- then the historical perspective could
be carried through consistently and adequately.
All this might be dismissed as a counsel of perfection. So it is very
largely. The book is of a quality which makes us ask for more, satis-
fied and delighted though we are with the present contribution. Most
of the criticisms here proffered are due largely to the fact that the
present reviewer feels strongly identified with the position taken by the
writers. Even those who might regard the present book as "a major
trouble case in modern social science", will profit by reading it,
struggling with it, and clarifying their own ideas. I am convinced that
the sound and fruitful position taken, by the authors is essentially
correct. I hope that it may be amplified especially with reference to
the inclusion of the law of order, the law as it works, that is the law
which lives in the community, and not only that law which is adminis-
tered against the law breakers. The book as it stands is as valuable
in provoking some critical reactions, as in its fine achievements and its
fundamental contribution to legal theory, to ethnography and to the
study of primitive normative systems.
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